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1. Introduction 
Without doubt, the world is currently facing a staggering financial crisis. Hyperboles such as the 
‘financial crisis of the century’ or ‘credit tsunami’ have recently been employed to highlight the scope 
of the event.1 However, the fact that it may be merely the financial repercussion of significant real-
economy events appears to have been utterly disregarded. It would seem that, out of nowhere in 
particular, a financial debacle, arising from an immaculately conceived real estate market bubble, if you 
would, grew, and then suddenly burst, to wreck havoc on the world. This has led to innumerable 
attempts to develop intricate theories of the causes of such a bubble formation, obviating thereby the 
need for paying attention to why the bubble burst – after all, it was a bubble to begin with – 
unsustainable by definition. 
 
There was a real estate market bubble that formed in the U.S., we are told, that burst around 2006. It 
started because too many people bought houses, of whom many were not credit worthy, still they were  
able to buy houses because they were aided by mortgage loan originators who did not engage in 
adequate due diligence required by law to determine these borrowers’ credit worthiness. Why did 
mortgage lenders behave in such an irresponsible manner? Because they could originate a mortgage 
loan, and turn around and sell it to mortgage consolidators who, in turn, bundled mortgages from 
different states in America, and sold such a mortgage derivative, called mortgage backed security or 
MBS, to other investors such as investment banks, hedge funds, institutional endowments, retirement 
funds, domestic and foreign private banks, and central banks and treasury departments of various 
countries. Since mortgage-default risk was borne by these final holders of MBSs, and not by the 
original mortgage lenders, the latter had little incentive to diligently assess the credit worthiness of 
additional buyers of houses. That is how more demand for houses got created, house prices rose, and 
the bubble grew bigger. This is a clean and clear story, but as I argue, it is misleading because of its 
inadequacy. 
 
Like all bubbles, this bubble also burst suddenly, and those who had been holding once-prized MBSs in 
their portfolios suffered capital losses when the prices of their MBSs fell, eventually to zero, in turn 
because those who could ill afford houses they had bought defaulted on their mortgage loans. Since the 
institutions that were holding such ‘toxic’ assets could not convince anybody to buy these MBSs, they 
became cash strapped. What is more, when their customers decided to withdraw their investments, 
these institutions could not comply, and thus became insolvent. Solution: governments should buy 
these currently worthless assets, and thus remove them from the balance sheets of these institutions, by 
injecting large enough doses of cash, so that such these banks, funds and institutions return to healthy 
balance sheets. Such measures have been adopted, in exchange for governments acquiring ownership 
claims on these institutions, but they have failed.2 This part of the story is also clean and clear, but as I 
                                                 
1
 An example is Washington Mutual, which is the biggest – $300 billion – bank failure in American history, because its 
customers withdrew $16.9 billion in the ten-day period between September 15 and September 25, 2008. Moreover, to take 
just one measure, the S&P500 Index was on September 1, 2000, and again on June 8, 2007 above the 1,500 mark. At the 
end of October 2008, it is hovering around 950. It would have to rise by more than 50% of its present value to recover all 
the losses in equity values. In fact, taken together, the loss of total equity value in the U.S. since January 1, 2008 is over $5 
trillion to date. Similar phenomena have been observed in a number of countries including Japan, Germany, France, the 
U.K., South Korea, Australia, China, India, Thailand, Iceland and Brazil, among many others.  
2
 The U.S. Treasury Department spent $85 billion in September 2008 to purchase 79.9% interest in the world’s largest 
insurance company, American International Group (AIG), $200 billion to buy Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both mortgage 
guarantors, another couple of hundred billion dollars to bailout a few other financial institutions such as Northern Rock 
from going bankrupt, and $700 has been approved by the U.S. Congress as a ‘Bail-out Package’. There is another ‘Stimulus 
Plan’ worth $250 billion still under consideration. Moreover, South Korea has injected $107 billion, Austria has approved 
$114 billion, Sweden has guaranteed new medium-term liabilities of banks up to $205 billion France has approved $491 
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argue, it is still misleading because of its inadequacy. 
 
Such attempts to explain economic phenomena are thoroughly misleading, if not outright flawed, for 
four distinct though inter-related reasons. First, how do we know that these real estate and financial 
markets have not performed as well as markets typically perform? That is, how do we know that these 
markets have not merely played out some prior real-economy root cause of a consequent financial 
problem via the real estate and MBS markets? Do we have sufficient grounds for an indictment of these 
markets? The alleged malfunctioning of the real estate market and of the related mortgage-derivates 
market in the U.S. may not, in fact, be the fault of markets at all. 
 
Second, identifying unscrupulous practices of mortgage originators, unrealistic expectations of vast 
numbers of home buyers and unbridled greed of institutions that acquired once high-yielding MBSs as 
the culprits relies on the presumption that large numbers of human beings do not bring reason to bear 
on their choice of actions and thus do not take responsibility for the consequences of their actions, and 
in this very general sense, such explanations rely on personal irrationality.3 But, irrationality can hardly 
be considered the foundation of any reasonable theory; absolutely anything can be blamed on irrational 
behavior. 
 
Third, explanations of phenomena of recessions, depressions or of ‘crises of over-production and 
under-consumption’ have a long history in the hands of the likes of Karl Marx and Lord Keynes. These 
explanations have been given more sophisticated foundations by economists, but such theories receive 
short shrift and summary dismissal, without any explanation of why they should be ignored.4 An 
interesting point to note is that while almost all economies of the world, including the American 
economy, are experiencing more rapid than usual business failures, rising unemployment, fall in 
consumer confidence and a contraction in private consumer spending, a debate is still raging as to 
whether the U.S. economy is in a recession. This is because in the U.S., the authority to declare a 
recession has been given solely to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), which has quite 
arbitrarily decided that the definition of a recession is ‘two consecutive quarters of negative GDP 
growth’, which has yet to happen since 2002.5 On this definition, the American economy is not in a 
                                                                                                                                                                       
billion and Germany $681 billion, all with a view to providing security to all account holders in financial institutions in their 
respective countries. All major central banks in the world have reduced their interest rates, with the Bank of Japan’s rate 
down to 0.3%, and the U.S. rate at 1%. China undertook three interest rate cuts of 0.27% each in a six-week period, and the 
European Central Bank rate stands at 3.75%, among others. In addition, the International Monetary Fund has stepped in to 
provide $25 billion to Hungary, $17 billion to Ukraine, and the process is still underway. Since bank lending has come to a 
grinding halt, on October 30, the Federal Reserve agreed to provide $30 billion each to the central banks of Brazil, Mexico, 
South Korea and Singapore, effective until April 30, 2009, to mitigate the spread of problems in accessing U.S. dollars.  All 
this had happened by the end of October 2008. 
3
 See Sen (2000). 
4
 These theories include those of Michael Kalecki, and Luigi Passenetti, based on increasing income inequality, Costas 
Azariadis, Martin Bailey and Robert Gordon, based on implicit contracts, Peter Neary, based on temporary equilibrium with 
fixed prices and quantity constraints, Assar Lindbeck and Dennis Snower, based on the insider-outsider phenomenon, 
Robert Solow, based on the efficiency wage hypothesis, George Akerlof and Janet Yellen, based on near rationality, among 
others. 
5
 Thus, in spite of a doubling of foreclosures between August 2007 and August 2008, home price decreases by a country-
wide average of more than 20% since the beginning of 2006, the inventory of existing homes for sale at an all time high 
since the great Depression of 1929-36, unemployment rate at a seven-year high, the highest annualized rate of bankruptcy 
filings in 2008, and the consumer confidence at the lowest it has been since records were kept in 1967, the American 
economy is technically not in a recession because, in the third quarter of 2008 that ended on September 30, while consumer 
spending declined by 0.3%, GDP actually grew at a positive rate of 0.5%. There is something pathological about such a 
denial. Besides, who gave NBER the authority to decide on such a patently absurd and thoroughly narrow, single-criterion-
based definition of a recession? No self-respecting economist should ignore such a plethora of evidence of the ill health of 
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recession, and it cannot be for at least another six months. If this is not government-sanctioned official 
denial, I don’t know what is!    
 
Fourth, the practice of looking for the actions of a person, or of a group of persons, or of laws and 
regulations, to place blame for something gone awry, well intentioned as such an excise may be, serves 
the unfortunate purpose of distracting attention away from seeking politico-economic historical 
explanations, and constitutes an obstruction to a clear view of primary driving forces that are otherwise 
plain for one to see. 
 
A lot of soul searching is going on these days to examine the financial and banking systems and their 
regulatory mechanisms to find the financial-sector causes of the problems that have certainly expressed 
themselves in a financial form. The question remains open, however, as to why the current financial 
crisis could actually not have been a faithful market expression of financial symptoms of a set of real-
sector events that underlie mortgage-associated problems, which, in turn, have precipitated the current 
financial troubles. In other words, have we got the question right? It is precisely to this issue that I 
address this examination. Indeed, I identify the fundamental underlying real economy causes, 
distinguished from financial or mortgage-instrument-related causes, to explain the consequent 
extensive deprivation suffered by large numbers of people in the early part of the 21st Century. The 
explanation of the financial mishaps comes out in the wash. 
 
I argue here that the causes of the current problems facing the American economy and indeed the world 
economy are actually real, politico-economic events, and the remedy is also politico-economic in 
nature. It is not that financial solutions are completely irrelevant. Indeed they are necessary, but simply 
not sufficient. My explanation, therefore, is rightly seen as complementary to the analyses offered thus 
far, not as a substitute for them. My approach does, however, render the implications for effective 
policy prescription radically different from the suggestions proposed thus far. For, it is patently absurd 
to identify effective solutions exclusively with financial injections and amendments to regulations of 
financial institutions. Financial rescue plans, solely by themselves, can hardly be expected to withstand 
the burden of rescuing the American economy from its current woes. It is precisely because of an 
inadequate appreciation of the real economy causes of the current financial problems that solely 
financial rescue measures have been entertained thus far, and despite their enormous magnitude, they 
have failed to achieve their declared objectives.  
 
It is essential that we comprehend the basic, fundamental real-sector causes. Otherwise, we will merely 
engage in the treatment of symptoms, only to find them reappear subsequently. It does not, as it were, 
help to do plastic surgery on a person’s face that has turned pale because he is having a heart attack, 
while choosing to avoid bypass surgery that could save his life. We must get the question right, to get at 
the solution to the problem. This is the principal purpose of this paper. 
  
Widespread deprivation was actually well underway in the U.S. by 2004. This was noticed and 
                                                                                                                                                                       
an economy and still wonder if it is in a recession! Denial certainly has its value, for example in psychological self 
preservation, but official denial for an entire society can, and has been, the cause of much human suffering and widespread 
panic, in large measure, perhaps, due to considerably delayed public action against fairly visible signs of overall ill health of 
the American economy. In addition, because this economy is the largest in the world, with a projected GDP of $14.25 
trillion in 2008, that is more than three times the size of the next largest economy, that of Japan, its poor performance drags 
down the performance of virtually all other economies of the world, simply because America is the biggest buyer of almost 
all commodities except petroleum, in which China leads the world. The only fortunate consequence (fortunate for the 
petroleum importing countries) has been the fall in the price of crude oil from a high of over $140 per barrel to around $70 a 
barrel, because the demand for crude oil, while fairly price inelastic, is actually income elastic.   
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articulated by, among others, Congressman Frank Wolf of Virginia, who must be credited with a deep 
and early appreciation of this phenomenon.6 Before proceeding to find another explanation, it should be 
explained why Congressman Wolf’s explanation is unfounded. My purpose here is to subject claims 
such as those of Congressman Wolf’s to a careful scrutiny, and to ascertain the real causes of the 
financial crisis of the early 21st Century. I argue that not only are his claims well-founded, but that a 
more widespread deprivation of early 21st Century is bound to occur and will to be quite protracted. 
 
2. What is the Root Cause of the Great Deprivation of Early 21st Century? 
It was a long-standing political stance of the U.S. to engage China, at least since the Ping-Pong 
Diplomacy of President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger, which led up to the U.S. granting to China in 
2000 a permanent Most Favored Nation Status. Subsequently, in 2001, China was inducted in to the 
World Trade Organization. The consequence was that while in1990, one year after the Tiananmen 
Square massacre in Beijing, the U.S. trade deficit with China was $6 billion, in 2007 it stood at a 
whopping $251 billion, higher by far than with any other country in the world. The U.S. imports from 
China in 2007 were worth $321 billion, and European imports from China stood at $300 billion. This is 
because the Chinese manufacturing workers earn $6/day, contrasted with the American minimum wage 
that is above $6/hour (for an eight-hour day).7 
 
Moreover, again as a matter of political policy, in late September 2001, President Bush lifted trade 
sanctions imposed under the terms of the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act following India's 
nuclear tests in May 1998.8 From virtually no economic ties between the two countries for over three 
decades, in 2007 the U.S. exports to India were more than $17 billion, and the U.S. imports from India 
were $24 billion. The United States is now India's largest trading partner. 
 
 As has been the case with China, India has also been the recipient of significant Foreign Direct 
Investment. From 1991 to 2004, the stock of FDI inflow to India increased from USD $11 million to 
$344 million, totaling $4.13 billion, which constitutes a compound rate of growth of over 57% 
annually. Further, the United States is one of India’s largest direct investors. American direct 
investment in India in 2007 stood at $9 billion, accounting for 9% of total foreign investment into 
India, with a concomitant outsourcing of skilled American jobs to India. This is because Indian skilled 
workers earn less than $20,000/year, with comparable workers in the U.S. earning anywhere between 
60 and 150 thousand dollars annually.9  
 
Starting in 1998, right up to 2005, there was a real estate boom in the U.S., fed in part by the injection 
of Chinese trade-surplus-generated foreign exchange earnings into the U.S. financial markets, and in 
                                                 
6
 In fact, On March 24, 2004, Virginia Congressman Frank Wolf asserted, “As the fast-rising trade deficit with China 
documents, many of those jobs have gone to China as U.S. firms have moved their factories there. ...these deficits are 
composed of goods America recently produced for itself with U.S. workers in U.S.-based factories. … That deficit is a 
major reason the U.S. is losing its manufacturing base.  …  Commerce Department data show that since December 1997, 
over 3 million U.S. manufacturing jobs have been eliminated as imports replace domestic production.” 
7
 As noted by Congressman Frank Wolf, American capital moved to China in huge doses, causing plant closings in the U.S., 
and opening up American-capital financed manufacturing units in China.   
8
 This was related to India agreeing to monitor sea lanes for terrorist activity from Singapore to the Suez Canal. 
9
 Since India was a British colony, just as was America, a great many Indians are English speaking. Add to that the fact that 
the population of India is over one billion, and the fact that despite a literacy rate of only 61%, since the Indian government 
since independence in 1947 has made education free from primary level to PhD, there is a sizable army of educated, English 
speaking workers, a good many of whom belonged to a category known as ‘Educated Unemployed’. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that it is now possible for an X-ray radiograph taken in the U.S. to be digitalized, sent as an attachment to an 
email to a radiologist in New Delhi, it is read by a well-trained Indian radiologist, and the report sent back to the U.S. by 
email, all for $20,000/year, instead of paying an American radiologist $120,000/year.  
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part by the recycling of foreign exchange earnings of petroleum exporting countries. America also has 
the lowest down-payment requirements for house purchases in the world, so that when the former 
Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan cut the FED funds rate more than a dozen times in a row, 
these actions reduced the cost of borrowing, including the cost of mortgage financing, which in turn 
greatly increased demand for housing.  
 
There was also a dramatic improvement in the American terms of trade when in 1997-98 the currencies 
of S. Korea, Thailand, Malaysia and Hong Kong depreciated by fifty percent, and that of Indonesia 
depreciated by 80% in a mere 10-month period. As we know, an improvement of a country’s terms of 
trade raises its real income. American’s became richer in terms of real purchasing power with respect to 
purchases of imports from these East Asian countries, following the so-called East Asian Currency 
Crisis. This increase in American real income, in addition to injections of foreign countries’ net export 
earnings into the American financial markets, in combination with low-down payment requirements 
and successive interest rate cuts during Greenspan’s tenure as the Federal Reserve chairman, together 
led to such a real estate boom that more than two-thirds of American households ‘owned’ their homes 
by 2005. 
 
However, as more Chinese manufactures were imported, manufacturing production started to decline in 
the U.S.; more American workers were laid off. In addition, as more American corporations moved 
operations in the Information Technology and Pharmaceutical sectors to India, outsourcing of jobs to 
India mounted, and more American skilled workers lost jobs. In fact, by the end of October 2008, the 
unemployment rate in the U.S. was at a seven-year high. Unemployed people cannot make mortgage 
payments. Mortgage defaults thus rose sharply. In fact, in the twelve-month period ending August 
2008, foreclosures in the U.S. had increased 105%. 
 
In the heydays of the real estate boom, a collection of a couple of thousand mortgage loans from 
different states in America, known as a Mortgage Backed Security, or MBS, became the asset of choice 
for American banks, foreign banks, investment banks and retirement funds. There were sufficient real 
causes, distinguished from speculative causes, for real estate and MBS booms in the U.S., and there 
were, subsequently, sufficient real causes of a real estate bust, arising from increasing unemployment, 
due to outsourcing of skilled jobs to India and imports of significantly cheaper manufactured imports 
from China, among other countries. As a consequence, some 20% or so loans in the MBSs became non-
performing by October 2008.  
 
There was nothing ‘sub-prime’ about the MBSs in the heady days of the real estate boom. But, with 
increasing job losses, and the consequent increases in mortgage defaults in the U.S., the real estate 
boom came to an end, leading to one of the sharpest falls in the market prices of MBSs. For example, 
the investment banking firm Merrill Lynch sold $31 billion worth of MBSs in July 2008 for 22 cents on 
the dollar. The pre-conditions of The Great Deprivation of Early 21st Century in the U.S. were fully in 
place by the end of 2001, and by 2004 its effects were being felt, at noted by Congressman Wolf. Its 
financial manifestations, however, only became sufficiently visible to some in 2007 and to others in 
2008. 
 
Now the prices of MBSs with 75-80% well-performing mortgage loans have a market price of zero. 
Why? Simply because there is virtually no demand for these assets. Why? First, the supply of $6/day 
manufacturing workers in China has not been exhausted. Nor has the supply of $20,000/year educated, 
skilled English-speaking workers in India been exhausted. So, more job losses and thus foreclosures 
will occur. Potential buyers of these MBSs are naturally wary of acquiring such assets that contain 
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loans more of which will become non-performing. They consider these assets ‘toxic’. 
 
Thus the process of increases in unemployment across a wide array of skill categories has not ended in 
America. Nor indeed is the process of the consequent increases in bankruptcy filings and house 
foreclosures over yet. With more bankruptcies and foreclosures in the offing in the months and years to 
come, it is no surprise that Ben Bernanke, the chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, is urging the U.S. 
Congress to take such action that, “With the economy likely to be weak for several quarters and with 
some risk of a protracted slowdown, consideration of a fiscal package by Congress at this juncture 
seems appropriate.”10  
 
Second, since a larger proportion of loans in the MBSs will necessarily become non-performing, if 
buyers of MBSs are risk averse, there is also a risk-bearing costs (equal to the risk premium associated 
with the risky asset) that could be high enough to snuff out all demand, and send the market price of 
MBSs tumbling down to zero. 
 
Third, since the mortgage loan originators knew that the loans would be bundled into MBSs and sold, 
their incentive for doing due diligence, as required by law, was considerably diminished. This produced 
some MBSs that were ‘lemons’. Adverse selection therefore is yet another cause of the vanishing 
demand for MBSs, despite the bulk of the loans contained in them being well-performing, simply 
because a potential buyer does not know, with regard to future loan defaults, which MBS is a lemon 
and which is not . 
 
Fourth, at present, out of every four high school graduates in America, only one finishes college. 
Therefore there are not enough American workers who are employable in the category of jobs in 
innovation, R&D, and the like, that are the comparative advantage of the U.S., or there are enough 
Indians, East Europeans and other foreigners willing to do this work for substantially lower wage rates. 
In the foreseeable years, there cannot be a sudden increase in the number of skilled, educated, 
employable college graduates – simply because this process, even if started right away, take an average 
of four years to convert a high school graduate into a college graduate. This is precisely the reason why 
the deprivation episode of the early 21st Century is likely to be quite protracted. To expect the American 
economy to recover from its stagnant state by 2010 is highly unrealistic. In fact, it would be overly 
optimistic to expect the ‘recovery’ to even begin before 2011. The U.S. unemployment rate should be 
expected to increase. 
 
There is one additional significant fact that deserves notice. Income inequality has increased in the U.S. 
to the highest level since the start of the Great Depression in 1929. With some American capital having 
moved to China and India, American capital owners have incurred lower labor costs, thereby 
experiencing higher profit incomes. Simultaneously, American manufacturing and skilled workers who 
lost jobs to the Chinese and the Indians have experienced a fall in their incomes. Thus some have 
become richer in America, and others have become poorer. Actually, the top 1% of income earners in 
the U.S. garnered 8% of national income in 1980, but now they earn over 20%. This is depicted in 
Figures 9 and 10 below. This considerably higher income inequality implies that the increase in 
spending by richer, capital-owning Americans is more than offset by a decline in spending by poorer 
non-capital owners, because the richer persons have a higher marginal rate of saving (and therefore a 
lower marginal propensity to spend on consumption).  This is a crucial point that must also be taken 
into account in evaluating the remedies to what ails the economy, especially in light of the fact that by 
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 October 20, 2008. 
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during 2008 alone, job losses in America are in excess of three-quarters of a million persons, with the 
attendant hardship suffered by their families. Indeed, even if an expansionary fiscal policy like the New 
Deal is adopted, that would definitely serve to generate additional demand for labor in public-works 
programs such as infrastructure development, but these new jobs would be low-wage jobs, and while 
somewhat beneficial, will still keep large numbers of Americans at lower standards of living than was 
earlier the case. 
 
The lesson to be learned from all this is that the adoption of policies merely for cleaning up the balance 
sheets of banks, investment banks, retirement funds and insurance companies is, by itself, doomed to 
fail. Such policies only treat the symptoms, not the disease, so that the symptoms will reappear 
subsequently. A much more comprehensive policy mix would appear to be necessary to pull Americans 
out of the deprivation from which they are already suffering, one which is likely to be quite protracted. 
 
In the following I develop a simple, formal, general equilibrium model of the American economy in 
two steps. First the model of the economy in its pre-2000 phase is developed in Section 3. In Section 4, 
I describe the solution of the model. A non-Walrasian temporary general equilibrium model of the 
American economy with fixed prices and quantity constraints, intended to capture the salient features 
of the economy after it experienced a social earthquake-like structural shock due to a sudden exposure 
to 2.3 billion people of China and India, is presented in Section 5. This immediately leads to a 
comparison of the equilibria the two structurally different economies, which reveals the real causes of 
the financial crisis of early 21st Century.  In Section 6, I offer some concluding remarks, and allude to 
some potential remedies for The Great Deprivation of Early 21st Century. Whereas these models are 
real in nature, I present in Appendix I a fully monetized model of the economy that exhibits commodity 
trade, factor (capital) flows and financial flows. Appendix II deals with some issues of interpersonal 
income distribution and changes therein. 
 
3. A Miniature Model of the American Economy  
Let all economic activity in the American economy be divided into three broad sectors, the export 
sector, with a domestic output of X, the import-competing-good sector with domestic output M, and an 
internationally non-traded good sector with an output of N. We can, if it helps, think of X as the output 
of skilled services (IT, R&D, etc.), M as industrial output (of TVs, computers, refrigerators, cars, etc.), 
and N as the output of home goods (such as roofing services, health-care services, and so on), which 
require contact between a provider and the customer. 
 
Let the production function in the export sector be, 
 
  =  ,  ,           (1) 
 
where SX and KX are the employment of skilled labor and capital, respectively, and F( ) is a concave and  
linearly homogeneous production function with indispensable inputs and positive and diminishing 
marginal products.11 Similarly we can specify, 
 
  =   ,  ,            (2) 
                                                 
11
 For a two-input production function, concavity, constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal products together 
imply that inputs are cooperative, insofar as a larger employment of one factor induces an increase the marginal productivity 
of the other. That is, FSK = FKS > 0. 
A ‘hat’ over a variable denotes its endogenously determined general equilibrium value in the initial, pre-structural-shock 
state of the economy. 
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where LM and KM are the employment of unskilled labor and capital in the domestic production of 
manufactured goods, and G( ) is a similar production function.12 In the non-traded sector, the 
production function is 
 
  =  ,  ,           (3) 
 
Where LN  and SN , are the employment of unskilled labor (as roofers, for example) and skilled labor (as 
medical doctors, for example), respectively, and H( ) is again the usual production.  
 
In (1), (2) and (3), capital is internationally mobile, as well as intersectorally mobile across export and 
import-competing production sectors. Unskilled labor is only mobile between the import-competing 
and the non-traded sectors of the economy, and its supply is exogenously fixed. While skilled labor is 
intersectorally mobile between the export and non-traded sectors, it is internationally immobile, and its 
supply is perfectly inelastic.13  
 
I assume that all markets are perfectly competitive. That is, all three sectors are populated by many, 
though finite, firms that act as price takers in both commodity and factor markets. Further, all firms in 
each sector are cost-minimizing profit maximizers, and there is free entry and exit of firms in long-run 
Walrasian general equilibrium. Then, international mobility of capital implies that, in general 
equilibrium, 
 
 ,  = ∗ ,            (4) 
 
where pX  is the exogenously specified world price of the country's export commodity, which one might 
recall is  IT services, FK  is the marginal product of capital, and  r* is the exogenously determined 
world rental rate of capital.14 
 
Similarly for the import-competing sector, international capital mobility implies that the value of 
marginal product there must also equal the same rental rate of capital that prevails in the world 
economy. Thus, 
 
  ,  = ∗ ,         (5) 
 
where again, pM  is the world price of the manufactured good that this economy's import-competing 
sector takes as parametrically fixed, and GK  is the marginal product of capital in manufacturing. 
 
In the pre-shock state of the economy, the values of marginal product of unskilled labor in 
                                                 
12
 Throughout, I treat manufacturing workers as unskilled workers, not because they are completely unskilled, but because 
they are less so. 
13
 Agriculture contributes barely 2% to GDP and employs less than 1% of the labor force. This stylized fact is utilized in 
making some bold assumptions in the formulation of the model of the American economy, with the linkages to India and 
China to be specified presently. 
14
 Notice that this r* is the effective world rental rate of capital that American entrepreneurs can avail of in general 
equilibrium, before they have access to much lower manufacturing and IT wage rates in China and India, respectively, and 
inter alia before they can avail of the consequent higher returns to capital investment in these countries (due to lower labor 
costs). 
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manufacturing and non-traded sectors must to be equal in general equilibrium, as is the case with the 
values of marginal products of skilled labor in the export and non-traded sectors. Thus, we have 
 
  ,  = ̂ ,  =  ,        (6) 
 
and 
 
  ,  =  ̂ ,  =  w         (7) 
 
where wL and wS are the economy-wide unskilled and skilled wage rates determined endogenously in 
general equilibrium. 
 
In (6) and (7), it is important to make a distinction between the pre-shock real-sector conditions that 
obtained, and the state of affairs post-shock. Thus we also have, 
 
  M + N = L,          (8) 
where L was the fixed supply of unskilled labor, and (8) is its sectoral allocation before 2001, and 
 
   X + N = S,          (9) 
 
where S was the fixed supply of skilled labor, with (9) as its sectoral allocation before 2002. 
 
Domestic demand and supply of the non-traded good sector determines the domestic price of the non-
traded good in equilibrium, so that, 
 
    ,  , ̂ , ! =  (̂ , ∗,  , ),        (10) 
 
where Y is national income (or the GNP of the country), that is an argument of the domestic aggregate 
demand function for the non-traded good in (10), 
 
 ! =  +  + ̂ =  +  +  +  + ∗( + )  (11) 
  
on the presumption that all human and physical capital employed in the country in the initial general 
equilibrium are domestically owned.15 
 
This completes the specification of the model, except for an explicit treatment of the currencies and 
foreign exchange rates, on which I comment in the Appendix I, and issues of interpersonal income 
distribution that I take up in Appendix II. 
 
4. Initial General Equilibrium 
To see how the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables are determined by the relationships of 
the model of the American economy, before the tsunami of 2.3 billion people hit the U.S., some 
                                                 
15
 There are some issues related to the interpersonal distribution of endowments, and inter alia the distribution of income in 
the economy, with serious implications for both the interpersonal aggregation of commodity demands and for the 
assumption of interpersonal comparability of these personal demands, in the empirically significant case when the incomes 
are unequally distributed. This pertains to both descriptive and prescriptive matters. I take these up in Appendix II. 
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pictures might help. These are presented in Figures 1 through 4 below. 
 
Notice that in the model, the exogenous variables,  are  pX , pM , r* and L and S, the world prices of 
the export good, the import-competing good (equal to the world price of imports), the world rental rate, 
and the inelastic supply of unskilled and skilled labor, respectively. To obtain the reduced form of the 
model, substitute for LN from the unskilled labor supply constraint (8) in (6), for SN from the skilled 
labor supply constraint (9) in (7), and substitute for Y from (11) in (10). With these substitutions, taken 
together with (4) and (5), (6), (7) and (10) are five equations in five endogenous variables: KX, KM, LM, 
SX and pN. These five relations uniquely determine the general equilibrium values of these five 
endogenous variables, and then the rest are obtained by appropriate substitutions.16 
 
Of course, in addition to the assumptions made about the structure of production, it is important to note 
that some additional assumptions have to be employed to guarantee the existence and stability of 
equilibrium. These are (I) the skilled and unskilled wage rates and the price of the non-traded good are 
perfectly flexible; (II) personal preferences are defined on the set of ordered triples of the quantities of 
the three commodities consumed by a person, and these preferences are represented by a binary of 
relation of weak preference that completely orders a finite set of alternatives. This relation satisfies the 
properties of strong monotonicity and convexity and continuity. 
 
These assumptions not only guarantee the existence of general equilibrium, but they also produce 
downward-sloping excess demand curves for all commodities and factors of production, so that under 
the a wide array of adjustment mechanisms, this general equilibrium is, in fact, stable. Of course, 
because Walras law for markets holds, only relative prices are determined in general equilibrium. This 
solves the model completely, and a graphical solution is presented in Figures 1 – 4. 
 
5. Adjustment to Structural Shocks  
The stage is now set to subject this economy to a sudden exposure to 2.3 billion people, starting 2000-
2001, with vast numbers of low-cost unskilled, manufacturing workers in China (willing to work for 
wChina < L) and low-cost skilled workers in India (willing to work for wIndia < S ),  thereby 
offering to the American capital owners greater profit-income opportunities, if only they would move 
their capital to these countries to avail of significantly lower labor costs. 
 
Given lower labor costs, the rate of return on American-owned capital becomes higher, so that (4) and 
(5) change to (4a) and (5a), respectively, insofar as the values of marginal products in the Chinese 
manufacturing and Indian IT-related activities now equal r** > r* in China and India. Moreover, in 
the post-structural shock state, (6) changes to (6a) and (6b), and (7) changes to (7a) and (7b) below. All 
four of these changes constitute structural shocks, not infinitesimal changes. More on that presently, in 
Section 6. 
 
The new, post-2001 structural model consists of (1) – (3), (10) – (11), and 
 
 % , & = ∗∗ >  ∗ ,           (4a) 
 
                                                 
16
 From (8) and (9) the values of N and N can be obtained. Substituting the value of all of these endogenously determined 
values in (1), (2) and (3) gives the general equilibrium values of the outputs of the three sectors, and from (6) and (7) we 
obtain the two wage rates. 
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 ( , & = ∗∗ >  ∗ ,        (5a) 
 
 ( , & = )*+,- <   ,        (6a) 
 
 /0 , 0 =  ,         (6b) 
 
 % , & =  1,2+- <   ,         (7a) 
 
and 
 
 /0 , 3 =  .         (7b) 
 
Equations (8) and (9) no longer hold in the new, non-Walrasian temporary general equilibrium with 
fixed domestic unskilled and skilled wage rates that are pegged at the pre-shock values, due to which 
quantity constraints emerge, as in Neary (1980) and DeLorme, Naqvi and Wemho5 ner (1995), among 
others. 
 
The solution of this second structural model is presented in Figures 5 – 8 below. Here UUnskilled and 
USkilled are the unemployment of American manufacturing and skilled workers, respectively. These are 
the persons who lost jobs as a consequence of the sudden and abrupt exposure of the American 
economy to the economies of China and India between 2000 and 2002. 
 
To see how the endogenous variable values are determined in the post-structural shock of the economy 
in general equilibrium of a very different nature, notice that from (4a), (5a), (6a) and (7a) the values of 
the four variables  & , & , (   and % are uniquely determined. 
 
A heuristic explanation is that, once the politically imposed barriers to American capital investment in 
China and India were dropped in 2000 and 2001 respectively, a higher rate of return on capital r** 
could be earned, because of a lower unskilled wage rate in China wChina ,  and a lower skilled wage rate 
in India wIndia , some American capital started to flow to these two countries. This led to both some 
manufacturing and some IT businesses closing in the U.S., which, in turn, was associated with 
employment of smaller quantities of capital in the two sectors at home, in the amounts 6 and 6 , as 
indicated in Figure 5 and Figure 6. 
 
With less productive capital employed in these two sectors, there occurs a fall in the marginal products, 
and therefore the values of marginal products, of unskilled labor in the manufacturing (import-
competing) sector, as well as of skilled labor in the IT services (export) sector of the American 
economy, simply because the two sets of inputs in these sectors are cooperative (positive cross partials 
of the production functions). From Figure 7 and Figure 8, we see leftward shifts of these values of 
marginal products curves for unskilled labor in the import-competing sector and of skilled labor in the 
export sector. 
 
Reduced employment of labor in these two sectors to ( and % leads, in the next round, as it were, to 
inward shifts of the values of marginal product curves for capital in Figure 5 and Figure 6, again 
because inputs are cooperative. Thus the final general equilibrium employment of productive capital in 
the two sectors falls to & and &, as indicated in these two figures and in Equations (4a) and (5a). The 
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amount of productive capital that flows to China is simply &)*+,- =  − &, and the capital flow to 
India can be seen to be &1,2+- =  − &, so that 8(9 = &)*+,- +   &1,2+-is the aggregate productive 
capital flow from the U.S. to these two countries. It is also useful to define 82 +  89 = 8 as the total 
amount of American-owned productive capital, of which 82 is the amount employed at home, which is 
less than k. There is capital flight from the U.S. to China and India as long as r** > r*. 
 
Since  −  ( unskilled workers and  − % skilled workers lose jobs in the import-competing and 
the export sectors, respectively, in (11), the GNP of the country changes from !  to 
 
 !( = ( + & + /6 + ∗∗8 = )*+,-( + 0 + 1,2+-% + 3 + ∗∗8  .  (11a) 
 
This is a subtle point that deserves explanation. In (11a), we have ( = % , & <  from (1) 
because of lower employment of both skilled labor and capital in the new temporary equilibrium. 
Similarly, from (2) we obtain & = ( , & <   for similar reasons. Since American capital owners 
have a choice of employing Chinese unskilled workers in China or American unskilled workers in the 
U.S., in the import-competing sector the wage rate will have a tendency to converge to the Chinese 
unskilled wage rate. Similarly, Indian skilled workers in the IT services sector are substitutes for 
American skilled workers in the export sector as far as American capital owners are concerned, because 
of which this wage rate in the U.S. will also have a tendency to converge to the Indian skilled wage 
rate. 
 
Such is not the case, however, with the unskilled workers or the skilled workers in the non-traded 
sector in America. Therefore, in a temporary equilibrium with fixed prices and quantity constraints, 
there need not be such a strong tendency for convergence of these wage rates to the corresponding rates 
abroad, so that unemployment will have a tendency to emerge as a temporary equilibrium phenomenon 
at the pre-shock wage rates, thereby leading to the employment of 0 <  unskilled workers in the 
U.S., with :&;,<=+>>?2 = 0 − ( of these workers becoming unemployed, because the short side of the 
market always prevails in a temporary equilibrium with fixed prices and quantity constraints. This is 
displayed in Figure 7. Since this process is still underway, and has not reached completion yet, one 
should expect the unskilled unemployment rate to rise in the months and years to come. Of course, in a 
long-run Walrasian general equilibrium, the flood of unemployed workers – both skilled and unskilled 
– both wage rates will have to fall in the U.S., since the exposure to china and India is now a reality for 
Americans. 
 
By a similar argument, :&=+>>?2 = 3 − % skilled workers will become unemployed in the U.S., as 
indicated in Figure 8, again as a temporary equilibrium with fixed prices and quantity constraints. This 
process is also not complete yet. However, the numbers of skilled Indian substitute workers are far 
fewer in number, so that this process should be expected to be completed earlier. 
 
There is, however, another problem that the U.S. faces in the case of skilled workers. First, there is no 
actual shortage of demand for unskilled workers; if there were, why would skilled jobs be outsourced 
to India. It is merely that the American skilled workers have to get accustomed, in the long term, to 
working for lower salaries than they were used to in the pre-shock state of the economy. Second, as 
already noted, since only one out of every four high school graduates in the U.S. finishes college, 
getting educated takes years, and since the kind of new jobs that are created in America are of a skilled 
nature, in turn due to the American comparative advantage in innovation and R&D, the phenomenon of 
there being far too many unemployable American workers should also be expected to persist for a few 
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years. This phenomenon will exhibit itself alongside the unemployment of that category of skilled 
workers for whom there are substitutes available in India. 
 
In any event, !( ≠ !, 0 ≠  , 3  ≠  . Therefore, this, and the fact that with quantity constraints 
the price of the non-traded good, /, in the new non-Walrasian general temporary equilibrium is 
simply not, in general, the same as this price, ̂, in the initial, pre-structural-shock general 
equilibrium. To see this, note that (10) changes to 
 
   % ,  , / , !( =  6(/ , ∗,  , , 0, 3).        (10a) 
  
There is still the issue of an increase in interpersonal income inequality concomitantly with a positive 
rate of growth of real national income until 2008, and a contraction of this aggregate that is expected 
2009 onwards. The model presented so far is not capable of handling this issue. However, an extension 
is proposed in Appendix II that does indeed address this matter and the issues of aggregation and 
interpersonal comparability, both in the context of description (positive analysis) and in the context of 
developing policy prescription (inevitably a normative analysis).       
 
To compare the collective human wellbeing actually realized by the American people in the two 
general equilibria, all we have to now do is to specify a collective human well-being evaluation 
measure. Then we would be ready to solve for the value of this index in the pre- and post-structural- 
shock situations.17 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The problem, however, is more intricate. It is as if the American economy is now caught in the classic 
Liquidity Trap of Lord Keynes: consecutive interest rate cuts are simply not spurring up productive 
investment spending, in terms of creating new businesses or expanding existing ones. This also is not 
all. An increase in aggregate government spending in terms of expansionary macroeconomic fiscal 
policy will also fail. This is because while the unemployed may get temporary relief, these will be jobs 
in the public works programs, which are low-wage jobs, and not the ones that provide a high standard 
of living in the intermediate to long term. 
 
Insufficiency of demand for skilled labor in the U.S. is, in general, the not problem. The decline in such 
demand is only for those specific types of skilled workers for whom easy substitution is possible from 
amongst Indians in India, so that only such skilled jobs get outsourced to India? Moreover, in the 
private sector, the kinds of jobs typically created in America are in the range of innovation, R&D, and 
at the upper end of the skilled spectrum. There is still demand for a wide array of such other type of 
skilled workers, for whom substitutes in India cannot be found, but a very large fraction of American 
workers are, for the first time, not employable., because they lack these skills. So, what is required is 
                                                 
17That is, for the phases both before and after the American economy was suddenly exposed to 2.3 billion people we can 
then ascertain the impact on the extent of realization of well-being of the American people, or lack thereof. The collective 
human well-being evaluation index I would adopt is  W = yα (1 – G)β  , where y is per capita income, G is the Gini 
coefficient of the interpersonal income distribution in the US, and α and β are non-negative parameters that embody the 
value judgment regarding how much weight in social evaluation should be given to distributive considerations and how 
much to the scale of average achievements. For an axiomatic derivation and for a persuasive justification of the use of this 
measure of collective human well-being, see Sen (1976) and Naqvi (2008). Suffice it to say that this Collective Human 
Well-being Evaluation Measure is ordinally measurable. This measure incorporates the distributive value judgment of 
inverse interpersonal-income rank-order weights. Also, for β = 0, this index coincides with GDP, for a fixed population size, 
and thus GDP is a special case of this social evaluation index. 
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micro-targeted specific human resource development, to provide resources – outright grants for higher 
education, skill-acquisition and on-the-job training, and loans to support such activities and to provide 
additional incentives specifically aimed at developing a diverse and highly skilled labor force that is 
both in demand in the U.S. and is employable. But it takes time for a person to become educated, which 
is precisely the reason why the Great Deprivation of early 21st Century is bound to be protracted. 
 
In addition, management of unemployment compensation is also a significant issue. If a person loses 
her job, she gets unemployment compensation from unemployment insurance, but the amount is quite 
meager, certainly in comparison with countries such as Germany, which has a considerably lower per 
capita income. In addition, the laws pertaining to unemployment benefits are such that she would get 
paid for six month, and in the following six month, she must earn at least twenty per cent of what she 
received in the first six, otherwise she is not even eligible to apply for unemployment benefits. This 
pushes large numbers of unemployed people in American into both not being counted as unemployed, 
and into a state of poverty. 
 
Reduction of broadly construed economic inequality by use of such a policy mix as provision of 
resources and incentives for education and acquisition of skills as part of a coherent human-capital 
development plan is a long term solution. Along with this, however, is required adoption of poverty 
reduction measures in the short term, including taking public action against hunger and homelessness 
in America, particularly for those workers who have been displaced as a consequence of direct or 
indirect external-sector shocks taking the form of productive capital out flight and cheaper 
manufactured imports. There has to be a shift away from management of monetary policy, which has 
already proven ineffective in recovering equity value losses of over five trillion dollars in 2008 alone, 
despite more than a one trillion dollar injection into the financial system. There also has to be a shift 
away from macroeconomic fiscal policy, except as a measure of temporary relief. The policy shift 
would have to be towards microeconomic policy formulation and implementation, especially with 
regard to a specific human resource structural development programs. 
 
Just calling the $700 billion bank-cleaning spending-package a ‘Bail-out Package’ or a ‘Rescue Plan’ 
does not make it so. It takes more than words and labels. More Americans in 2008 have filed for 
bankruptcy or have faced foreclosure than in any year in the history of the country in the past 80 years, 
and there appears to be no end in sight. It is not helpful at all to reduce income or capital gains tax 
rates, certainly not for those who are unemployed or do not own businesses. Interest rate cuts do reduce 
the cost of borrowing, and in this manner serve to increase profit income (as would be the case with a 
reduction of capital gains or income tax rates), but we have seen that such policy changes have 
completely failed to stem the tide of business bankruptcies. As it happens, the ‘trickle down’ that 
worked during the Regan presidency of the 1980s will fail to be effective across-the-board in America 
today, because more profitable business conditions for entrepreneurs will cause the trickle to reach 
China and India, not down to ‘Main Street’ America, because labor costs are much lower abroad.   
 
This argument implies that the problem is not only much deeper than one that merely requires cleaning 
up the balance sheets of financial organization, but it is also more complex than one that just requires 
restructuring of mortgage loans to keep people in their houses.  
 
This too is not all. When the U.S. government took 79.9% interest in AIG as part of the bail-out, it 
bought a controlling interest in a number of insurance activities. The U.S. government is now in the 
insurance business. AIG, for example, provided insurance against business credit risk, so that, if Air 
India, for example, were to order 20 aircraft from Boeing, AIG would guarantee the contract, so that if 
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the manufacturer produced the planes, and if the buyer defaulted, then AIG would cover their losses. At 
the present time, the U.S. government is engaged in such business as well. 
 
Moreover, as the most evolved free-enterprise economy in the world, U.S. administrations used to 
routinely criticize countries that nationalized banks, and yet the U.S. government now owns controlling 
interests in a number of major banks and has thus effectively nationalized banks, and thus now own 
houses and cars that are now bank owned, as a consequence of foreclosures and repossessions. The 
American economy has changed, at least for now. The system, the social formation, has undergone 
internal transformation, and is undergoing further transformation, as part of a process that actually 
began around 1998.  
 
Just as from the ashes of the Great Depression of 1929-36 emerged a new World Economic Order, with 
the U.K. losing its economic leadership position to the U.S.A., a new social formation has begun to 
emerge on the World landscape. It is unlike any system that has come before. But, this should not come 
as a surprise. It is a fact that economic systems have evolved from one form to another distinct one in 
social history. As social anthropologists have informed us, there was once Primitive Communism as the 
dominant social formation, about five thousand years ago, but that is gone forever. It was replaced in 
most societies by the Slave-owning system, which lasted a few thousand years. Then came Feudalism, 
which lasted for several hundred years, and in some countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan it is 
still alive. In some other parts, as in the United States, there was direct transition from Slavery to 
Capitalism. But, Capitalism has only been around for less than 300 years. Why should one think that 
this social formation will not undergo transformation – radical transformation – to become a 
qualitatively different social formation? It would be patently absurd to suggest that new economic 
systems will cease to appear on the social landscape. Aside from death and taxes, if there is one thing 
we one count on, it is change. A new social formation has emerged. What we are witnessing is the 
emergence of a new world economic system, one I like to think of as World Market Capitalism, or 
simply WMC. 
 
It is important to appreciate that an economy is a living, breathing animal. That it has a life of its own. 
It is not an inanimate object. We are part of it, our beliefs are components of it, as are the institutions, 
the laws and political structures we create. As we change, as our beliefs get altered, the laws we live by 
are changed, and the political, economic and social institutions undergo transformation. When 
sufficient modification occurs in the components of an economy, it becomes a qualitatively different 
social organism. It is then time to give it a new name, otherwise there is a very real fear of confounding 
two distinct social formations, and thereby incorrectly seeing them as conceptually identical. That, we 
must avoid, for clarity of thought and precision of analysis. The partition between the two social 
formations must be recognized. What is WMC, and what is it not? What are the distinguishing features 
of early 21st Century capitalism? 
 
First, WMC is not the characteristic of a nation state. What WMC refers to is an entity that simply does 
not respect national boundaries. It is thus not a social formation that is usefully investigated in terms of 
units taken to be countries, as has been the practice in contemporary economics. Unlike some previous 
conceptions of a capitalist economy, WMC is not trapped within the political boundaries of a nation 
state. For example, it is pointless to discuss with any coherence the American economy without 
including its connections with the economies of China and India (or Canada, Mexico, Japan and the 
OPEC). 
 
Second, it is not Imperialism, the Highest State of Capitalism, as prophesied by Vladimir Lenin in 
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1916, who saw the merging of banks and corporations as the root cause of emergence of finance 
capital, and predicted that export of capital, rather than of commodities, would be the norm and the 
identifying characteristic of the system. On the contrary, in WMC, commodities flow in ever larger 
volume and value from one region of the World to another, and embodied in these commodities are the 
lowest-cost labor and the lowest-cost capital, regardless of who owns these resources. 
 
Third, unlike Karl Marx, who saw Capitalism as a mode of production that constituted a stage of 
transition from feudalism to socialism, WMC is certainly a distinct social formation, but it is not 
socialism, because the means of production do not have social ownership. They continue to be 
privately owned predominantly, though some erstwhile privately conducted economic activities have 
shifted to the public domain.   
 
Fourth, in WMC, capital whether in terms of human-made tools and implements of production, or in 
terms of finance capital, ceases to be a binding constraint; it flows fast and furious to wherever, in 
whichever country, developed or not, a safe and high rate of profit can be earned.18 Effectively, then, it 
is safe to assume that there is an unlimited supply of capital in the world, or, what is the same thing, 
those businesses that demand capital face a perfectly elastic supply curve of capital at a parametrically 
given supply price. This is an essential feature of WMC. The governments of the U.S., the EU and 
Japan, among others, have lost quite a bit of the control they once had over capital flight into or out of 
their economies. 
 
Fifth, unskilled labor in WMC also does not constitute a binding constraint, and thus has a perfectly 
elastic supply curve, because in the world trading system, manufactured goods can be produced in the 
lowest-cost regions of the world, and they can then be exported to wherever they are demanded, to 
supplant any shortage of unskilled labor in that localized region of the world, where the prices of 
manufactured goods may have been higher. Thus, for all intents and purposes, from the point of view of 
anyone in the world who wants to buy a manufactured (unskilled labor-intensive) product at the lowest 
price (equal, in long-run equilibrium, to average cost), it is safe to assume there is an unlimited supply 
of unskilled labor. This too is an essential characteristic of WMC. 
 
Sixth, skilled labor would also have ceased to be a binding constraint, because a much wider array of 
skilled tasks can now be done far away from the location where final output is demanded, in turn 
because of the now available information super highway that is firmly in place. In addition, reliable and 
fast modes of personal transport available at relatively low costs also permits greater contact among 
parties striking business deals. However, in spite of these facilitating recent developments, the only 
binding constraint in WMC is a resource that is sometimes described as Human Capital, or really the 
size of the educated and skilled labor force.19 
 
Seven, during the process of emergence of WMC, expansionary monetary policy ceases to be effective 
in pulling the peoples of the various countries out of the protracted deprivation from which they suffer 
during the transformation. Instead, expansionary fiscal policies, not merely aggregative in the sense of 
                                                 
18
 It follows that a shortage of capital for workers to work with, a phenomenon induced by it called Marxian 
Unemployment, cannot arise in WMC, because only a foreign-investment-hostile climate can keep foreign capital away, and 
thus be the cause of a capital shortage. 
19
 The reason that energy ceases to be a constraint that bites as hard as the skilled-labor constraint is that while substitution 
possibilities exist among crude oil, natural gas, bio-fuels, solar energy, wind energy, hydroelectric energy, and nuclear 
energy, among others, it is difficult to find an economist or a physicist as a substitute for a cardiac surgeon to do angioplasty. 
Thus easy substitutability among skilled workers of different types is not really an option. 
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being macroeconomic, but a set of specifically targeted fiscal policies intended to remedy particular 
economic imbalances in a country, become the only public policies that are effective in alleviating 
extensive human deprivation.20 
 
In this context, there is much to be learned from the so-called East Asian Currency crisis that began in 
1997-98. Between June 1997 and February 1998, the currencies depreciated by 50% in Thailand, S. 
Korea and Malaysia, and by 80% in Indonesia. This caused a massive deprivation episode from which 
these countries have yet to recover. To get an idea of this, consider, for example, the world market for 
rice, which is consumed as a staple in these countries. Since the world price of rice is dollar 
denominated, marginal-income families could buy only half as much rice with their incomes after their 
currencies had depreciated. As a consequence of such impoverishment (measured in terms of an 
internationally traded good such as rice), in Malaysia, there were communal riots in which the 
businesses of many Malaysians of Chinese ethnicity were burnt. In Indonesia, the regime of Suharto, a 
dictator who had ruled with an iron hand, was overthrown. In South Korea some women who gave 
birth left their newborns at the steps of different churches around the country because they knew that 
they would simply not be able to feed them – these children came to be known as IMF Orphans, 
because the IMF gave a one-time or two-time injection of money in an attempt to prop up the values of 
these currencies. 
 
This of course failed, because the cause of this currency depreciation was a decline in U.S. demand for 
the currencies of these countries, in turn due to a fall in the rate of growth of U.S. import demand for 
East Asian commodities (because China was getting its most favored nation status temporarily renewed 
annually, as a prelude to receiving this status on a permanent basis in 2000). A decline in import 
demand growth is an annual flow phenomenon. Since this fact was not appreciated, a couple of stock 
injections that were given by the IMF could not possibly fix this problem, because a flow is one that 
recurs year after year. 
 
It is crucial to remember that if something is called a ‘currency crisis’ as in the case of East Asia 
starting 1997-98, or a ‘Financial Crisis’ as starting in 2007-08 in the U.S. and then in the world, it only 
serves to shift attention away from the real (non-monetary) causes and thus consequences. The usage of 
such nomenclature has the unfortunate consequence of diverting attention away from the human 
suffering, and thereby leading even seasoned economists to focus far too much effort on relatively less 
significant matters such as the ‘contagion effect’, to the complete exclusion of seeking effective 
remedies for extreme human anguish associated with these phenomena. If this lesson regarding 
deprivation suffered by human beings is not learned from the so-called ‘East Asian Currency Crisis’, 
which was only the apparent symptom of a radical real-sector shock, it would be a grave error, with 
calamitous consequences in the form of human torment, not unlike the agony of mothers giving up 
newborns, increases in the numbers of orphans, higher incidence of child labor, and greater prevalence 
of hunger, among other such things. We must not forget that real lives of people are involved, and it is 
imperative that such policies be adopted that will alleviate human misery that is typical of such Great 
Deprivation episodes.21 For, when people lose jobs, they suffer, their children experience distress, 
                                                 
20
 Henrik Egbert’s interpretation points to a shift to a microeconomic management of the economy by the state. 
21
 In addition, there occurs gross misallocation of resources. A phenomenon on the rise in the U.S. is that as more people 
lose jobs, they lose their medical insurance, so that the emergency rooms of hospitals become their primary care facilities. 
This creates a situation in which doctors end up attending more to treatment of, for example, cases of influenza-induced 
fever, and other such medical problems, and they have less time to devote to life-threatening problems that require urgent 
attention. Many more patients also get shunted from one hospital to another because the emergency rooms of hospital get 
clogged with relatively less exigent cases. An increase in the incidence of such phenomena affects life expectancy of 
disadvantaged groups rather adversely.  
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relationships break up, people get depressed, divorces occur, and families are abandoned. Misery 
spreads.  
  
If the distinction between the real-sector causes and the financial-sector consequences is not 
appreciated sufficiently, there is a very high likelihood that the deprivation that has been suffered 
already by people in the U.S., which is bound to become quite severe in the months and years to come, 
and which will spread to other countries to cause enormous hardship in other parts of the world, will be 
ignored once again, because the phenomenon will be seen as a mere ‘financial crisis’, and the remedies 
that will be adopted will only constitute a treatment of the symptoms, not a cure for the inherent 
problem at the core. Ideology is not the issue here, but one of averting needless pervasive human 
torment. 
19 
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Appendix I 
 
Feenstra (1986) demonstrates the equivalence between the model with money in the utility function and 
a broad class of transaction cost models of money, including inventory-theoretic, liquidity cost models, 
and the Clower (1967) cash-in-advance formulation. This equivalence offers important guidance for 
modeling consumer behavior in monetary economies. 
 
Let F  , F , F and F be the prices of goods X, M, N and nominal money, measured in a standard unit 
of account. Define relative prices,  = F/F ,  = F/F ,  = F/F  and  = F/F = 1,  as the 
prices of goods X, M, N and money in terms of money. Money is now the numeraire, and + is the 
relative price of i.22 We distinguish +,  which is the home (or U.S. dollar) price of good i in terms of 
money, from +∗, which is the world price of good i. The units of measurement of +∗ may be foreign 
currency units. However, if e is the exchange rate, then I+∗ is the world price of good i measured in 
home currency units.23  
 
Assuming that the economy in question is a small, open economy, it takes +∗ as exogenously as given 
on world markets, for i = X, M. Further, we can define J = K(  ,  , ) as an index of home 
commodity prices, so that K( ,  , ) is a positive valued, monotonic increasing, K+ > 0, and 
linearly homogeneous function. In this framework, M/J would be the demand for real balances, as in 
Samuelson and Sato (1984), and Dusansky (1989), among others. To capture the real purchasing power 
of nominal balances K(F  , F , F) is to be interpreted as the true cost-of-living index. 
  
The budget constraint of this monetized economy in terms of home prices, or the balance of trade 
constraint of the economy, is  
 
   +   +   + M =  +  +  + ∗∗(8 − 82) + MN .   (A1) 
 
In (A1),  + is domestic consumption demand for good i, and MN is supply of money, and ∗∗(8 − 82) is 
the net American factor income earned from foreign direct investment abroad, in this case from 
investment in China and India, with k being American-owned productive capital, and kd the amount of 
this capital employed at home. By definition, 89 = 8 − 82 = )*+,- + 1,2+-, is American FDI 
abroad.24 
 
To tie up the demand side of the model with the supply side as in (1) – (10) in the body of the paper, all 
we have to do is to specify that the production possibilities surface is tangent to the commodity price 
plane, which implies that 
 
 O + O + O = 0.        (A2) 
 
Noting that in the budget constraint (A1), since N is a non-traded good, so that   = , and denoting 
American export supply by P =  −   > 0, and its import demand for manufactured goods by 
                                                 
22
 Sometimes pi is also referred to as nominal price. 
23
 For example, if e = 1.3 $/€  and if +∗ = 200 €/bottle, then pi = 360$/bottle (of a certain single-malt scotch whisky).  
24
 Gerald Pech suggests that to include the phenomenon of rising housing prices, as in the real estate market boom, which 
did occur, even though  it was not the sole root cause of the problems facing the American economy today, can be included 
in (A1) as Q( * − ℎ)+  +   +   + M =  +  +  + ∗∗(8 − 82) + (MN − M)  , so that with 
MS = (MN − M) > 0 , an increase in housing prices can be explained, where h is the supply of houses,  * the demand for 
houses and * the price of a house. 
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T =   −  > 0, an alternative expression of the budget constraint of this monetary economy is 
 
 M − MN = (P − T) + ∗∗(8 − 82) . 
 
In this version of the economy’s budget constraint, if the value of American exports P exceeds the 
value of imports T, that is, if the U.S. runs a balance of trade surplus, then it undertakes additional 
hoarding of the foreign currency, which, valued in terms of the home currency, is simply (P −
T) > 0.
25
 In addition, if American net factor earnings from abroad (China and India) are 
∗∗(8 − 82) > 0, then net annual financial hoarding in the U.S. is increased by this amount, totaling 
M − MN > 0 of additional financial claims Americans develop on foreigners annually. 
 
To tie up the demand side of the model with the supply side as in (1) – (10) in the body of the paper, all 
we have to do is to specify that the production possibilities surface is tangent to the commodity price 
plane, which implies that 
 
 O + O + O = 0. 
 
Reality has, however, been quite different. The U.S. has been running a merchandise trade deficit for 
four decades now, first the largest with the OPEC, then the largest with Japan, and for more than five 
years now, the largest with China, followed by Japan, Canada and Mexico. Moreover, while net factor 
income earned by Americans from abroad has been clearly positive, and increasing in the last decade 
due to growing American FDI in China and India, concomitantly with declining American productive 
capital investment at home, in size this net earned income from abroad remains dwarfed by the 
American merchandize trade deficit. Thus China, India, the OPEC, and other countries have been 
accumulating financial claims annually, in the amount MN − M > 0, in the form of U.S. dollar reserves. 
 
Quite a substantial portion of these accumulated financial reserves of foreign countries happened to 
have been held by the Bank of Japan, Deutche Bank, and Central and private banks of France, South 
Korea, Britain, and Treasuries of the OPEC countries, among others, in the form of American Mortgage 
Backed Securities. When these MBSs started to lose value rapidly, because some Americans who 
became unemployed because of (a) outflow of American-owned productive capital to china and India, 
and (b) greater imports from china that led to shutting down of plants that had been producing import-
competing products, not only did the value of the capital of these institutions decline substantially, but 
some of them were unable to convert their accounts payables into cash when they matured and became 
due for delivery to their customers. Still others, especially investment banks, could not come up with 
cash because seeing the insolvency of so many financial institutions, some customers decided to 
convert their equity and securities holdings into cash. This also required such institutions and hedge 
funds to sell the MBSs, creating a glut in the market. This has been the intermediate real cause of the 
financial crisis of the early 21st Century, although the initial, root cause was purely political insofar as 
there was a sudden removal of commodity trade and capital flow barriers between the U.S.A. on the 
                                                 
25
 If the petroleum import bill is also explicitly included in the model, this becomes M − MN = (P − T − UA), with 
U as the world price of petroleum (denominated in US dollars) and A as American annual import demand. It can be argued 
that for the U.S., A is fairly price inelastic, but quite price elastic. If so, then an expected fall in American aggregate 
spending could easily explain a fall in the world demand for crude oil, and thus a fall in its world price, both because of a 
direct decrease in American demand, and because of a consequent fall in demand for oil in other countries due to a decline 
in the production and transport of commodities for which American demand has fallen. This would imply that OPEC 
modest cuts in oil supply (in the neighborhood of a couple of million barrels per day) will only serve to further reduce their 
petroleum export earnings, but will fail to raise the world price of oil.    
26 
 
one hand, and China starting around 1997, and on a permanent basis in 2000, and India starting 2002. 
27 
 
Appendix II 
Simplification in theorizing per se is valuable. To include details in a model that are not material to the 
issue of interest goes against the minimalist approach, and is thus analytically uneconomical. Indeed, 
an argument can be made that even if theory and reality are quite different, as long as the theory 
predicts well, we ought not to make a fuss about the disparity between the two, no matter how different 
they are. This argument does have some merit, but only for the purpose of predicting or explaining 
market behavior, which deals with descriptive analysis. But this argument is completely irrelevant to 
conducting policy evaluation, which must be based on a yardstick, which, in turn, must inescapably 
embody a value judgment about the content of the concept of greater economy-wide human wellbeing, 
for the explicit purpose of making policy pronouncements. It is impossible to simplify a value 
judgment without altering it because social evaluation is, in fact, specific to the particular social reality 
itself.  
In particular, the assumptions that (1) all persons in an economy have identical preferences, and 
(2) this common binary preference ordering is homothetic, are sometimes invoked to render differences 
in personal incomes irrelevant in economic analysis of policy evaluation. In fact, in an economy, the 
homotheticity of identical personal preferences is sufficient for portraying market behavior and 
outcome by that of a single, representative (or aggregate) person. However, this homotheticity fails to 
provide any ground whatever for an equally-weighted aggregation of distinct interpersonal incomes, 
which is involved in the typical use of a country’s real national income for the purpose of policy 
evaluation in economics. The property of homotheticity of preferences merely says that if a person is 
indifferent between two personal commodity bundles a and b, then this person is also indifferent 
between proportionately smaller of larger bundles αa and αb, ∀α > 0. Since ought cannot be inferred 
from is, it immediately follows that homotheticity of personal preferences does not imply that an 
equally-weighted sum of distinct interpersonal incomes, also known as real national income, should be 
taken as a measure of realized public wellbeing. If any particular weighting scheme of distinct persons’ 
incomes is adopted, including an equally-weighted one, for making policy evaluation judgments, it 
constitutes an exogenously imposed value judgment, not one entailed by homotheticity. Judging by the 
confusion in the policy evaluation literature, I cannot overemphasize this important distinction between 
the roles of homotheticity in description versus evaluation. The argument presented here paves the way 
to look for measures of collective human wellbeing such as the one in (12). 
 
In calculating a country’s real national income or per capita income, the incomes of all persons in a 
country are added. This constitutes an equally weighted sum of interpersonal incomes. It is impossible 
to take any type of interpersonal aggregation, without first assuming that interpersonal comparability is 
admissible. While ordinally measurable personal characteristics can be assumed to be characterized by 
partial interpersonal comparability (Sen 1970, Chapters 7 and 7*), in obtaining the value of aggregate 
income, it is an implicit assumption that there is full unit interpersonal comparability, which is quite 
unnecessary. Indeed, the qualitative order of the problem of interpersonal comparability is the same 
regardless of whether it is the sum of the quantities of interpersonal consumption of a particular 
commodity, or it is an interpersonal aggregation of personal incomes, or it is interpersonal aggregation 
of wellbeing salient personal utilities that is involved. After all, just because a mango in the hands of 
the poorest person and a mango in the hands of the richest person have the same physical (and 
chemical) properties, it does not give us ground to deceive ourselves into thinking that they are the 
same commodity. From an economic standpoint, they are as distinct as apples from oranges, and the 
number of apples and the number of oranges are typically not added meaningfully. While in the 
calculation of real national income, poorer and richer persons’ incomes are given equal weights in the 
aggregation procedure, in the calculation of the collective human wellbeing measure in (12), a poorer 
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person income is attached a higher weight. Each measure comes with its own inexorable ethical 
commitment, embodied here in the distinct weighting schemes. However, despite these differences in 
the calculation of real national income and of W in (12), there is no escape from the assumption of 
interpersonal comparability, regardless of whether or not this is made transparent explicitly. 
 
Before Keynes’s General Theory in 1936, Michael Kalecki had already developed a macroeconomic 
theory in an obscure article published in polish, and he used to tease the young Keynesians of the time 
such as Joan Robinson about some inadequately developed parts of Keynes. I sketch below a slightly 
modified version of a part of Kalecki’s argument that underlies the problem of decline in aggregate 
demand arising from an increase in income inequality in an economy. 
 
Consider an economy with finite n persons with V ≥ 3, and to capture the stylized facts of the 
American economy, suppose there are four classes of persons, and that a representative of each is 
characterized by distinct endowments. A person’s endowments can be captured by an ordered triple 
XY = (ZY, [Y , 8Y), where l, s and k refer to unskilled labor, skilled labor and capital, respectively. One 
class is of unskilled workers with ZY > 0, [Y = 0, 8Y = 0 , denoted j = L. Second is of small business 
owners characterized by ZY > 0, [Y = 0, 8Y > 0 , j = b, third, skilled workers with ZY = 0, [Y > 0, 8Y =
0 , j = S, and entrepreneurs with ZY = 0, [Y > 0, 8Y > 0 , j = e.  
 
Without loss of generality, assume that if ZY ≠ 0 → ZY = 1,  [Y ≠ 0 → [Y = 1, 8Y ≠ 0 → 8Y = 1 . 
Assume further that the earnings of these factors are )*+,- <  < 1,2+- < ∗ < ∗∗ <  , all 
denominated in U.S. dollars.26 Since my purpose is merely to demonstrate that there exist 
circumstances in which the observed stylized facts of the past decade in the U.S. economy can arise, 
restricting the structure by such assumptions is harmless. In the initial, full employment equilibrium, 
the incomes of the representative persons of each class are  <  + ∗ <  < ∗ +  , on the 
additional assumption that  + ∗ <  , which is also a harmless assumption for an existence result. 
Thus, initially, unskilled workers earned the least, small business owners the next most, skilled workers 
earned more, and entrepreneurs earned the highest incomes. 
 
Assume further that the marginal propensity to spend on consumption, ] was inversely related to 
personal incomes, though constant for each income class. Thus, ] > ]^ > ] > ]? . With the number 
of persons in each class given by V > V^ > V > V?, aggregate spending in the initial equilibrium 
turns out to be  
 
 !2 = ]V_ + ]^V_^( + ∗) + ]V_ + ]?V_?(∗ + ) .    (A4) 
 
In the post Sino-American and Indo-American exposure temporary equilibrium, since some workers 
became unemployed, and some small business owners filed for bankruptcy, the number of employed 
unskilled and skilled workers and small businesses became fewer, V/ < V_ , V/ < V_ , V/^ < V_^,while 
the rate of return on capital invested in China and India, by assumption by entrepreneurs only, became 
higher, ∗∗ > ∗. Thus, aggregate demand in the new equilibrium of a structurally different economy is  
  
 !(2 = ]V0 + ]^V/^( + ∗) + ]V0
  + ]?V_?(∗∗ + ) + ]V/)*+,- + ]V
1,2+- .  (A5) 
 
From a comparison of (A5) with (A4), it is easy to see that both income inequality and real national 
                                                 
26
 While harmless for my objective, the assumption about the rank order of ∗∗ and  is not crucial to the argument, 
whether in the initial or the final equilibrium. 
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income can rise simultaneously, as actually happened in the U.S. in the past decade (actually longer), 
but that, after a point, increases in income inequality would necessarily be associated with a fall in 
aggregate demand and thus national income, in part because richer persons have a lower marginal 
propensity to spend on consumption. 
